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  Executive Summary
  This paper gives a broad overview of the evolution of Belgian 
aid policies throughout the 1990s. It documents changes in stated motives and 
objectives, aid volumes, poverty orientation of aid, the structure and main 
components of the aid programme, the use of new types of aid instruments, 
the geographic concentration of aid and the institutional set-up. Official rheto-
ric on aid motives and objectives as it is captured in subsequent official policy 
notes is confronted with effective aid practice. It is argued that aid practice 
was strongly influenced by factors which are external to deliberate aid policy 
making.
  Crisis in the countries in Central Africa, which were tradition-
ally major beneficiaries of Belgian aid, for instance, did heavily impinge upon 
the structure and main components of the aid programme, the aid volume and 
the geographic concentration of aid whereas internal political discussions in 
Belgium, in particular linguistic tensions, largely dominated the various in-
stitutional reforms of the aid department.4 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 • 5
  Résumé
  Cet article retrace l’évolution de la politique de coopération belge 
pendant les années 90. Plusieurs aspects sont passés en revue: les motifs et 
les objectifs changeants du  discours officiel, le volume de l’aide, l’accent mis 
sur la réduction de la pauvreté, la structure et les composantes majeures du 
programme de l’aide belge, l’usage fait de nouveaux instruments de l’aide, la 
concentration géographique et les structures organisationnelles. La rhétorique 
officielle telle qu’elle émane des différentes notes de stratégie est confrontée 
avec la pratique. Est analysée la façon dont des facteurs externes à la politique 
de coopération ont influencé les résultats.
La crise dans les pays de l’Afrique centrale, qui étaient les bénéficiaires 
traditionnels privilégiés de l’aide belge a eu, par exemple, des incidences sur 
la structure et les composantes du programme de l’aide, le volume et la con-
centration géographique, alors que les réformes ou propositions de réformes 
des structures organisationnelles de l’aide ont été largement dominées par des 
discussions internes belges, notamment le contentieux linguistique entre les 
communautés et régions du pays.6 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 • 7 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 • 7
  Introduction: Overview and Major Issues
  The  1990s  were  a  challenging  decade  for  development  co-
operation in Belgium. In Africa the former colony (DR Congo1) and the 
territories  formerly  administered  by  Belgium  (Burundi  and  Rwanda) 
witnessed coups d’Etats, civil war, regional conflicts, genocide and immense 
suffering by the population. Hundreds of thousands of people lost their lives 
in  all  three  countries.  Aid  to  this  region  constituted  the  core  of  Belgian 
African policies, both in terms of volume of aid and geopolitical attention up 
to the late 1980s. The crisis affecting the three countries wiped out decades of 
development aid and constituted a major challenge for Belgian policy makers. 
For some observers, it was evidence of the failure of Belgian aid policies. 
At a political level, the reaction to the crisis of the 1990s by successive 
Belgian governments varied. Belgium suspended aid to DR Congo in 1991, 
following the reported killing of students by Mobutu’s paratroopers on the 
Lubumbashi university campus, and from then onwards took a tough stand 
against the regime. This constituted a major change of heart.  In the ensuing 
period of regime change, instability and war, Belgium was active on the 
diplomatic front and supported regional efforts to find a peaceful solution. It 
also provided humanitarian and emergency aid to DR Congo, making it the 
first bilateral donor to DR Congo in 1999-2000 [DAC, 2002a]. In Burundi, 
Belgium supported the transition to a democratic system in the early 1990s 
and used aid to this effect.  But in October 1993 the first democratically elected 
president Ndadaye was murdered by the Tutsi military after only a few weeks 
in office, and the country plunged into political and military instability from 
which it had yet to recover at the end of the decade. In Rwanda the early 1990s 
witnessed the onset of a major internal military conflict between the regime 
in place in Kigali and the invading forces of RPF troops from Uganda made 
up of former Tutsi refugees. Belgium was involved in the search of a peaceful 
solution here too, using both aid and diplomatic means, and putting pressure 
on Rwandan president Habyarimana to enter into negotiations with the rebels 
and sign the 1992 Arusha peace agreement. Belgian troops, present in the 
country as part of the deal to supervise the implementation of the Arusha 
declaration, were caught up in the fighting that started on the 6th of April 
1994 when the plane carrying president Habyarimana and his colleague from 
Burundi was shot down. Ten Belgian paratroopers were killed by the army, 
and the Belgian government pulled out its troops and contributed to the non-
intervention of Western governments in the dreadful weeks that followed2. 
The Belgian government contributed humanitarian aid after the genocide, and 
then gradually resumed its structural aid to Rwanda.
In the course of 1995 the Belgian political world was shaken by a series 
of highly critical articles published in the Flemish daily ‘De Morgen’3. They 
painted a picture of failed Belgian aid projects in all three continents. A major 
charge was that commercial interests had the upper hand in decision making, 
resulting in wasteful ‘white elephants’ which did more harm than good. The 
1 We will use the new name of DR 
Congo even when referring to the 
period when the country was still 
named Zaïre.
2  An  all-party  parliamentary 
commission  was  later  set  up  to 
investigate the role of Belgium in 
the 1994 events in Rwanda [Senat 
de Belgique, 1997] 
3  The  journalist  who  wrote  the 
articles later produced a book on 
the  same  topic.  See  de  Coninck 
[1996].8 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 • 9
projects that were singled out for attack had received most of their funding 
through the ministry of finance rather than the aid department, yet the former 
was never seriously questioned, and the latter got all the blame. That a series 
of articles could have such an influence may seem at first sight remarkable. But 
official aid policies had acquired over the years a poor reputation with political 
commentators and many rank and file members of parliament. The criticism 
thus struck a chord with those disenchanted observers, and was amplified in 
the media and parliament. A special parliamentary commission was set up 
that formulated a set of recommendations to improve the working of the aid 
department [Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, 1997]. Several senior 
officials were removed, and the government embarked on a major overhaul 
of  the  administration.  The  Belgian  Administration  for  Development  Co-
operation (BADC), a semi-autonomous unit within the ministry of foreign 
affairs, was restructured and integrated, although not fully merged, into the 
ministry of foreign affairs and renamed Directorate General of International 
Co-operation (DGIC). At the same time, an independent operational branch, 
the Belgian Technical Co-operation (BTC), was created, modelled on the 
German GTZ4. This reform has been criticised for being overhasty and badly 
conceived, but it certainly answered to an urgent political need.
Efforts  were  also  undertaken  during  the  1990s  to  increase  the 
geographical concentration of bilateral aid flows. Not much did come from 
this.  Equally  unsuccessful  were  initiatives  to  increase  overall  political 
coherence between ministerial departments5, and between direct bilateral aid 
and aid channelled through NGOs and other non-state actors. 
During  the  1990s  the  Belgian  aid  strategy  shifted  away  from  its 
traditional technocratic and socio-economic focus. Partly as a consequence 
of the events in Central Africa and of the atmosphere of scandal surrounding 
development  co-operation,  the  secretaries  of  state6  responsible  for 
development co-operation during the 1990s put more emphasis than their 
predecessors on political and civil rights, and on ‘soft’ issues such as the 
environment and culture. In an important break with the past, it was decided 
that  aid  provided  by  DGIC  would  no  longer  be  tied  to  procurement  in 
Belgium. Development aid became, so to speak, purer. But it also became 
leaner. Aid flows diminished as a share of GNP, following a trend in other 
countries, although the fall was less dramatic than for DAC countries as a 
whole. In terms of instruments of aid, the 1990s not surprisingly saw an 
upsurge in the use of humanitarian aid. Direct bilateral aid gave increasingly 
way to aid channelled through the NGOs and other non-public actors. The 
influence  of  NGOs  on  official  policies  grew  considerably.  The  staff  of 
personal advisors (‘cabinet’) of the secretaries of state who held office during 
the 1990s saw the importance of collaborators with an NGO background 
grew considerably at the expense of officials from the aid administration or 
experts from universities, consultancy firms, or private business. Underlying 
this trend was the fact that in the eyes of public opinion and the political class, 
NGOs were the only major actor untainted by the scandal surrounding aid 
4 By Law of 21 December 1998, 
published  in  Moniteur  Belge 
[30/12/1998]. 
5  In  1994  an  Interdepartmental 
Working  Party  on  Development 
Co-operation  chaired  by  the 
State  secretary  for  Develop-
ment  Co-operation  was  created. 
While  some  efforts  were  taken 
to improve co-ordination among 
ministries  on  the  issue  of  food 
security, in general the Working 
Party was not very active and did 
not succeed in improving overall 
policy  coherence  [Schellens, 
2000]  [Jennes  and  Schellens, 
1997][DAC, 1997].
6 A secretary of state is a junior 
minister  without  a  seat  in  the 
cabinet.  For  decisions  requiring 
cabinet approval he reports to a 
designated senior minister.8 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 • 9
policies, notwithstanding the more critical assessment of the role of NGOs 
that began to appear in the press7. The ascendancy of NGOs was helped by 
several reforms in co-financing modalities that strengthened their financial 
and analytical muscle. The academic world also considerably increased its 
clout. This was mainly translated in a substantial increase in funding and a 
high degree of autonomy in implementation, rather than in any significant 
involvement in the debate on aid policy. 
During the 1990s, the three secretaries of state were all coming from 
Flanders, the Dutch-speaking part of the country. This continued a trend 
over the last two decades, in which development co-operation attracted more 
attention in the Flemish than in the francophone part of the country. For 
instance, the scandals pertaining to the aid department were brought out by 
a Flemish daily paper, widely discussed by Flemish politicians and NGOs, 
but were less noticed in the French-speaking part of the country. What was 
not foreseen was that the linguistic issue would all of a sudden become a 
major factor in the debate. During discussions among the coalition parties 
in the course of 2000 concerning a wide range of policy reforms providing 
more federal subsidies to the cash-stricken Walloon region and francophone 
community and more autonomy to Flanders, the possibility of handing the 
responsibility of major parts of development co-operation over to the regions 
became a hot issue. It was thrust onto the political scene in 2000 by a small 
Flemish political party (‘Volksunie’ or Flemish Union), whose support was 
needed to get the two-third majority needed for the reform package. There 
was also increasing support for such transfers of resources and political power 
on the francophone side, notably from the socialist party. The principle of 
handing over development co-operation to the decentralised level of authority 
was negotiated during a nightly marathon session, to the dismay of many 
development experts in the main political parties, the NGO movement, and 
the academic world. 
1.  Motives and Overall Objectives
  In Belgium, the official rhetoric on aid has evolved during the 
1990s. The end of the Cold War and the political and military instability that 
followed not only in Eastern Europe but also in Africa, brought new issues 
into focus. More than in the past, aid began to be seen as an instrument to 
bring  peace  and  stability  to  developing  regions  and  to  protect  European 
borders from floods of immigrants.  AIDS had also alerted public opinion that 
there was no effective way to cut the Western world off from the developing 
countries and their woes. Such changes in the justification for international aid 
mark the brochures and policy documents produced by successive secretaries 
of state in this period [DGIC, 1992, 1998 and 2001]. The new rhetoric may 
well be just that: a way of phrasing policy intentions in fashionable jargon for 
sale to the general public, without necessarily resulting in any effect on actual 
decision making. But this would be an unfair assessment of the considerable 
efforts  by  successive  Belgian  governments  to  renovate  development  co-
operation policies. 
7 See Achterhuis, Barrez, Tandon 
et al. [1993].10 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 • 11
Table 1: Governments in power
Government Coalition State secretary/Minister
Development Co-operation
(Political Party)
Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Political Party)







(Flemish  Christian 
Democratic Party) 
September 91- June 95
Christian Democrats and 
Socialists
State secretary E. Derycke
(Flemish  Socialist) 
W. Claes
(Flemish  Socialist Party)
From October 1994 onwards:
F. Vandenbroucke
(Flemish  Socialist Party)
June 1995 - September 99
Christian Democrats
and Socialists
State secretary R. Moreels 
(Flemish Christian Democrat) 
E. Derycke (Flemish Socialist)
exceptionally, Moreels re-
ported to the Prime Minister,
 J.-L. Dehaene,
(Flemish Christian Democrat)
September 99 - ...
Liberals and Socialists
and Greens
State secretary E. Boutmans
(Flemish  Green Party)
L. Michel
(Francophone  Liberal Party)
Table 1 gives an overview of the politicians in charge of development 
co-operation in the decade of the 1990s. Minister Geens ended his term in 
office in September 1991. In some ways he was imbued with the motives and 
objectives of a previous period, emphasizing poverty reduction through the 
funding of economic and social projects, less concerned with larger themes 
such  as  popular  participation,  sustainable  development,  gender,  or  local 
ownership.  He was succeeded by State secretary Derycke who was in charge 
of  development  co-operation  between  September  1991  and  June  1995.  A 
lawyer who came into development co-operation unexpectedly after a cabinet 
reshuffle, he then took on development co-operation as his main task under 
the next government, Derycke had to handle the major debacles in Burundi 
and Rwanda. A member of the Flemish socialist party, he tried to steer a 
cautious progressive course, linking aid policies to the wider political and 
institutional dimensions. He espoused the new themes of human rights, good 
governance and debt relief, and approached poverty as a multidimensional 
concept. In the following government he became Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
while newcomer Flemish Christian Democrat Moreels took on the position 
of State secretary for Development Co-operation (June 1995 till September 
1999). A medical doctor who prided himself of his experience as a ‘war 
surgeon’ and who had presided over the Belgian section of the international 
NGO Médecins Sans Frontières before entering politics, Moreels brought 
some experience with him in the field of humanitarian aid, and a passionate 
belief in linking aid to good governance and human rights. He also shared 
the humanitarian aid agencies’ instinctive preference for top-down, donor-
driven approaches managed by expatriate staff. He pursued many of the same 
topics as Derycke, but with more emphasis on humanitarian operations and 
on human rights. He also continued Derycke’s efforts to untie bilateral aid 
from procurement in Belgium. He openly denounced the principle of aid 10 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 • 11
tying and announced the unilateral suspension of the tying of bilateral aid 
disbursed under his responsibility. Boutmans, a member of Parliament for the 
Flemish ecological (‘green’) party, took over as State secretary in July 1999. A 
lawyer, and a cautious man by nature, Boutmans added the traditional themes 
of the greens, and his own - empowerment, culture, sustainable development   
- to those of his predecessors. But he felt more reluctant to preach recipient 
countries on good governance and sound economic policies as in his view 
donor  countries,  Belgium  in  particular,  do  not  always  provide  the  good 
example at home.
In many ways, these three politicians pursued similar overall objectives 
and gave Belgian aid policies a new sense of direction. The adoption of the first 
law on International Co-operation by Parliament on 25 May 1999 [Moniteur 
Belge, 01/07/1999] constituted a consolidation of these changes. The law lays 
out a new framework for the Belgian international development co-operation 
policy.  The  global  objective  of  Belgian  development  co-operation  is  to 
accomplish sustainable human development by combating poverty. Poverty 
reduction is presented as the prime objective of the aid programme. The 
concept of poverty is conceived as multidimensional, including economic, 
social and political aspects, opening room for the concept of human rights. 
In line with recommendations contained in the DAC strategy paper [DAC, 
1996], the law also strengthened the importance of sector policy papers and 
country  strategy  papers  [DAC,  1997].  These  documents,  first  introduced 
in 1996, were meant to translate the broad aid policy objectives into more 
specific objectives and concrete activities for a particular sector and country 
and provide an objective basis for subsequent monitoring and evaluation. 
Another law, dating from February 1994 [Moniteur Belge, 13/09/1994], 
illustrates the new spirit that pervaded the decade. It requires the government 
to report on the human rights situation in countries with which it wished to 
sign a general development co-operation agreement, and also to present an 
annual report on the human rights situation in programme countries. The law 
has not been well observed, except in its first years. Co-ordination problems 
between the departments of development co-operation and foreign affairs 
have undoubtedly contributed to this situation, as has manpower shortage at 
DGIC.
Turning to Belgium’s 6-month EU presidencies, in the second half of 
1993, Belgium pushed, not very successfully, the issue of debt relief. In the 
second half of 2001, Belgium tried to convince the EU members to become 
more active towards solving the crisis in DR Congo, again without much 
success.12 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 • 13
2.  Strategies, Major Principles and Guidelines, Major  
    Instruments: Rhetoric and Implementation
2.1.  Relations with Bilateral and Multilateral Donors and
  Recipients
 
  The discussion of new aid instruments may at first sight seem 
unrelated to the present heading. Yet it is in this context that the relations 
with recipients and other donors were most seriously challenged. During the 
1990s donors started to adapt their aid instruments, in particular project aid, 
to the criticisms being voiced. The weaknesses of projects in aid-dependent 
countries were increasing acknowledged and documented. Belgium in 1989 
started  an  experiment  of  ‘co-gestion’  or  joint  management  in  its  project 
funding to some recipient countries. Under ‘co-gestion’ the responsibility of 
donor and recipient were spelled out for the whole project cycle. The recipient 
was responsible for project identification, formulation and implementation. 
Belgium would have the final say in accepting the identification and formulation 
reports, and together with the recipient would take charge of evaluation. The 
system was meant to ensure that, while still very recognizably ‘Belgian’, 
projects would to a larger extent than before be integrated in the spending 
procedures of the recipient country. An important advantage was also that 
projects would be at least partially be untied, tendering for goods and services 
coming under the supervision of the recipient and being based on the principle 
of  free  competition.  Some  weaknesses  of  project  aid  remained  however, 
such as the use of Belgian rather than recipient government monitoring and 
control procedures, and de facto imposition of Belgian technical assistance 
during project formulation and implementation. Unfortunately the countries 
selected for the implementation of the new management system, Rwanda and 
Burundi, were caught in a spiral of institutional instability and violence, and 
the experiment ran only very partially. The system was applied tentatively 
to some other beneficiary countries, such as Bolivia, Tanzania and Vietnam, 
but limited to certain non-project transactions, such as debt relief operations 
[DAC, 1995]. Most of the features of ‘co-gestion’ have been adopted in the 
new management system elaborated for BTC. However, the system is now 
more complicated and unwieldy, with two partners of the Belgian side: DGIC 
for planning and BTC for supervision of implementation. It is too early at the 
time of writing to tell whether it can function flexibly and efficiently.
Belgium  has  been  reluctant  to  provide  general  budget  support  to 
developing countries. Budget support not only alters the relations with the 
recipient,  but  also  with  other  donors,  with  whom  a  strong  co-ordination 
becomes  desirable.  The  ambiguous  Belgian  attitude  is  illustrated  by  its 
handling of debt relief. In the early 1990s the Belgian official export credit 
agency, the Office National du Ducroire (OND), was in dire financial straits. 
Many of the export credit and insurance contracts it had accepted in earlier 
years had fallen through and the agency had accumulated a huge amount of 12 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 • 13
unrecoverable claims on developing countries, while on the other hand it had 
to pay out large sums of money to the Belgian firms that were parties to the 
contract. In 1991 it was decided that the Treasury would buy some of the OND’s 
outstanding claims on developing countries for half their face value, far above 
their market value, and thus provide needed liquidity to the organisation. As 
part of the deal, development co-operation was asked8 to contribute annually 
almost 14 million euro over a period of 12 years in exchange for which it 
would receive from the Treasury some of the debt claims which it could then 
in turn extinguish. Whether this is indeed genuine aid is a debatable point, 
but the DAC accepted it as ODA under its generous accounting rules. To the 
extent that a developing country would have normally repaid its outstanding 
debt service, debt cancellation can be considered a form of virtual budget 
support9. The recipient government is free to use resources it would have 
otherwise set aside for debt service payments. In this sense debt cancellation 
may be considered a form of virtual budget support. It is a striking feature 
of Belgian debt relief operations during the 1990s that aid officials usually 
insisted that the recipient government put aside an agreed sum of money in a 
special counterpart fund jointly managed with Belgium. In this way budget 
support was averted and replaced by the more familiar instrument of project 
aid. Aid officials remained largely oblivious to the criticisms voiced in this 
respect by academics and other experts.
Although Belgium was sceptical about granting budget support during 
most of the 1990s, there are some counter-indications towards the end of 
the decade, notably in the case of Niger and Mozambique10. DGIC seemed 
to be have been divided on the issue, with some senior staff in favour of 
budget support whereas the majority of the staff remain opposed. A factor 
complicating the use of this instrument was the opposition coming from the 
‘inspecteur des finances’, the official from the budget department stationed at 
DGIC who has to approve all spending prior to execution, and who opposed 
budget support on legal grounds. 
Following discussions in the framework of Special Partnership with 
Africa (SPA) in the second half of the 1990s, there has been some discussion 
about the integration of project aid in sector-wide approaches (SWAPs), where 
donors join sector policy dialogue with the recipient, and rely progressively 
on  recipient  procedures  for  spending  and  accounting  of  funds.  While 
acknowledging  the  arguments  in  favour,  not  much  happened  in  practice. 
In fact there was often limited sector coherence even at the Belgian level. 
In Rwanda for instance, Belgium was funding some 12 interventions in the 
health sector at the turn of the century, including some institutional technical 
assistance at the level of the Health Ministry. But no explicit overall sector 
strategy seemed to underpin the different interventions, which were managed 
as isolated interventions.
8 It is more correct to say that the 
deal was imposed on a reluctant 
Minister Geens by his colleague 
from  the  Treasury,  Philippe 
Maystadt,  and  the  rest  of  the 
government.
10 Both deals became operational 
in the period after 2000 and are 
not further discussed here.
9 To the extent the recipient would 
not have paid back its debt serv-
ice, there is no immediate effect 
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2.2.  Poverty orientation of aid
  Belgium  had  a  reasonably  good  track  record  on  poverty 
orientation during the 1970s and 1980s. This has to do with the geographical 
concentration on Central Africa. Table 2 shows that the situation in the 1990s 
is much less impressive. The data should be interpreted carefully because of 
the large part that remains geographically unallocated in the first half of the 
decade11. The percentage of ODA to the least developed countries remains 
high compared to the DAC. However if we consider the whole group of low-
income countries, there is not much difference between Belgium and the 
DAC average. The increasing share going to lower middle-income countries 
is striking. This evolution is not the consequence of some determined effort 
at reallocating aid resources, but rather of the crisis in the three Central 
African countries which eased the constraint on budget allocations to the 
other aid recipients. Low middle-income countries among the traditional aid 
recipients of Belgium, such as Bolivia, had a greater absorption capacity than 
the low-income countries, and they were accordingly rewarded with more 
aid. Interestingly, direct bilateral aid scored better than indirect aid in terms 
of orientation on poor countries. In the beginning of 1995 one of the authors 
wrote a comment in a Flemish NGO monthly publication12 comparing the 
geographical  orientation  of  Belgian  official  aid  and  that  through  Belgian 
NGOs. Using the Human Development Indicator of the UNDP as a yardstick, 
he calculated that bilateral official aid in the period 1991-1992 was more 
poverty oriented than the aid disbursed by NGOs with official co-financing.
Some insight into poverty orientation can also be glanced from sector 
allocations.  Table 3 provides a breakdown for the second half of the decade. 
Comparable data are not available for the earlier period because at the time 
DGIC used its own, idiosyncratic classification, which it finally abandoned in 
1998, and which is not strictly comparable to the international nomenclature 
used in Table 3. Few clear trends appear in Table 3, although health spending 
seems on the rise, as does support for government and civil society, banks and 
financial services, emergency aid and sensitisation actions, whereas support 
for agriculture, forestry and fishing went down. Sector breakdowns based on 
DGIC’s own classification (not shown here) indicate that the share of spending 
in the social sectors (education and health) almost doubled in the period 1990-
1997, whereas spending in support of industry went down from some 6 per 
cent to 1.5 per cent during the same period. 
11  [DGIC  2002d]  provides  a  de-
tailed statistical survey of Belgian 
development co-operation for the 
period  1997-2001.  There  is  no 
comparable reliable set of data for 
the whole decade, except what is 
published by the DAC.
12  ‘De  Wereld  Morgen’,  January 
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Table 2:  Distribution of ODA by Income Group
(net disbursements as per cent of total ODA)
1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 1992-1993 1993-1994 1994-1995 1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000
Belgium
low income countries  84.6 54.8 50.9 38.4 43.0 49.5 68.0 67.2 73.9  72.4 66.9
least developed countries  62.7 34.9 32.9 28.4 33.2 34.0 40.6 43.7 47.6  44.7 40.8
other low income countries 21.9 19.9 17.1 10.0 9.8 15.6 27.4 23.5 26.3 27.7 26.1
lower middle income countries 11.2 5.8 13.1 16.7 20.3 23.5 26.4 26.0 20.5 22.3 27.4
upper middle income countries 4.2 1.7 2.4 2.3 3.1 3.4 5.3 6.8 5.6 5.1 5.4
high income countries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
unallocated  0.0 37.7 33.6 42.5 33.4 23.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1989-1990 1990-1991 1991-1992 1992-1993 1993-1994 1994-1995 1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000
DAC average
low income countries 68.4 60.4 55.0 49.0 38.9 52.1 62.3 63.1 64.5 62.9 64.5
least developed countries 37.3 24.4 24.0 23.9 24.2 25.7 30.1 31.5 32.2 29.3 30.1
other low income countries 31.1 36.0 31.0 25.1 14.7 26.4 32.2 31.6 32.3 33.6 34.4
lower middle income countries 25.4 7.6 13.4 20.3 20.8 23.2 27.6 29.7 28.5 29.9 30.5
upper middle income countries 6.2 1.3 2.8 2.6 3.8 4.2 4.6 5.1 4.9 5.1 4.9
high income countries 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 2.9 2.4 5.5 2.1 2.2 2.1 0.1
unallocated 0.0 30.7 28.8 24.1 33.6 18.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Source: calculated on the basis of annual DAC Reports 1990-2001
The sector data have to be interpreted carefully however. In the case 
of education especially, most spending benefited tertiary education rather 
than primary or secondary education. An unpublished internal DGIC policy 
paper on education and training [DGIC, 2001a] points out that in the period 
1994-1999 only about 3 to 5 per cent of all spending in the sector went to 
primary education. As far as health expenditures are concerned, the situation 
is different. An unpublished internal DGIC policy paper on basic health care 
[DGIC, 2002b] indicates that over the period 1995-1999 on average about 38 
per cent of all direct bilateral Belgian aid in the health sector was spent on 
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Table 3: Sector breakdown of DGIC expenditure (% of DGIC total)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
BADC/DGIC administrative expenditure 6.01 6.89 6.11 6.70 6.01 4.60
Non-BADC/DGIC administrative expenditure 3.22 2.72 1.88 0.95 2.29 1.70
Education 11.02 9.45 7.79 10.27 10.29 9.99
Health 5.40 7.11 8.03 8.18 9.07 8.54
Population, health, fertility policy 0.99 1.39 1.05 0.96  0.91  2.60
Water and purification 1.52 1.75 2.32 1.73 1.60 1.38
Government and civil society 6.80  6.91 6.46 6.26 7.65 8.92
Social services 5.27 4.45 4.43 4.55 5.37 5.38
Transport and storage 1.16 0.99 0.84  0.55 0.75 0.63
Communications 0.69  0.70 0.67 1.26 0.19 0.14
Energy 0.65 0.72 0.40 0.19 0.28 0.14
Banks and financial services 1.76 0.79 11.56 9.04 9.03 9.21
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 13.25 13.66 9.06 9.12 7.71 8.65
Manufacturing, mining and construction 3.05 2.44 2.27 2.94 2.49 1.57
Trade and tourism 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.75 0.13 0.65
Protection of the environment 2.77 3.04  2.91 1.98  0.16  2.14
Women and development  0.46  0.39 0.71 0.39 0.53 0.51
Multisectoral uses 3.56 4.30 5.56 4.34 4.14 5.02
Non-food aid programmes 1.95 4.46  0.91 1.21 0.21 1.03
Security and food aid programmes 3.07 3.77 3.02 3.58 0.09 1.89
Debt related actions 2.92 3.56 2.34 2.65 2.49 2.96
Emergency aid (including emergency food aid) 3.17 4.54 6.11 3.94 6.84 5.30
Sensitisation actions in Belgium 0.00 0.01 0.07 1.41 2.21 2.16
Other non-allocated, non-specified  21.19 15.76 15.38 17.38 19.57 14.90
Source: DGIC [2001a]
Belgium also contributed to multilateral efforts that can be subsumed 
under the label of poverty reduction. In 1999 for instance it contributed some 
US$ 4 million to the HIPC trust fund of the World Bank and in 2000 some 
US$ 9 million to a fiduciary fund, equally administered by the World Bank, 
to enable the African Development Bank to extend debt relief to its members. 
Finally, a major instrument of poverty reduction was the Belgian Survival 
Fund  (BSF),  which  was  mostly  used  to  finance  projects  of  multilateral 
agencies. We devote some attention to this instrument in section IV. 
2.3.  Balance between old and new objectives
  The Law on International Development of 1999 stipulated that 
five sectors - public health, education and training, agriculture and food secu-
rity, basic infrastructure, and conflict control and reconstruction - and three 
cross-cutting issues - environment, gender and ‘social economy’ - would 
constitute the core of official Belgian aid efforts. Although all the state sec-
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emphasised similar sectors and themes, there are also specific accents mark-
ing out the three politicians. Derycke emphasised political objectives such as 
human rights, good governance and democracy. For the first time, a policy 
note on development co-operation paid more than scant attention to the cross-
cutting issues of gender and the environment. Some efforts were also made 
to integrate these aspects effectively into Belgian development assistance but 
understaffing at the Belgian aid administration made these efforts not entirely 
successful. The Women in Development Unit set up in 1987 and consisting of 
only two full-time staff and a newly set up Environment Unit (1.5 staff mem-
bers) were brought together in 1992 within the Department for Strategies and 
Development. Partly accommodating the needs of this limited staff capacity, 
an advisory board on gender issues was installed in the mid 1990s consist-
ing of independent experts and representatives from among others NGOs, 
universities, the aid administration and the cabinet of the State secretary. In 
general, the progress made by Belgian aid throughout the 1990s in terms of 
incorporating gender equality issues was far more noteworthy than the proc-
ess made regarding environmental issues. Sectoral and country policy papers 
were assessed on their degree of gender responsiveness and adjusted where 
necessary, whereas an assessment on environmental sensitiveness was com-
pletely lacking [DAC, 1997]. 
During  the  tenure  of  Derycke,  the  importance  attached  to  human 
rights and democracy was particularly visible. At that time, Belgium was 
fine-tuning  its  policy  of  political  conditionality.  In  1993,  direct  bilateral 
development co-operation aid to Rwanda was, for instance, made conditional 
on  democratisation  and  improvements  in  the  human  rights  situation,  and 
negotiations  with  Indonesia  on  a  new  general  agreement  broke  down 
because the Indonesian authorities refused to include a human rights clause. 
Government officials repeatedly stressed that official development assistance 
relations with DR Congo could only be re-established when human rights and 
other aspects of governance improved. The policy of political conditionality 
and Belgium’s policy towards Africa came under fire after the genocide in 
Rwanda.  In  February  1995,  an  important  policy  paper  was  published  by 
the  ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Vandenbroucke,  and  Development  Co-
operation, Derycke, which put new accents in Belgium’s Africa policy. While 
the paper stressed the willingness of Belgium to provide continued aid to 
Central Africa it added that this would no longer be  based on honouring 
any  ‘privileged relationship’. The paper also proposed a re-orientation from 
a paternalistic approach towards a ‘genuine partnership’ building on notions 
of ‘shared responsibility’, ‘local capacity building’, ‘sustainable development’ 
and the untying of aid. 
While it was not an explicit objective of Belgium aid at that time, 
political  circumstances  were  such  (see  Rwanda,  Burundi,  DR  Congo, 
Somalia) that an increasing portion of Belgian development aid was used 
for humanitarian assistance and emergency aid. Over the period 1990-1995, 
emergency aid expenditures more than doubled from less than US$ 5 million 
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In his policy paper, Moreels (1995-1999, Christian Democrat) drew 
special attention to humanitarian concerns. In practice, food aid, emergency 
aid, preventive aid and short-term rehabilitation aid became more important 
aid categories in Belgium. In 1999, for instance, spending on emergency aid 
(including emergency food aid) increased to 39.42 million US$ (see also 
Table 3 for percentage changes). Conflict prevention came to the forefront 
and internationally Belgium led the lobby for antipersonnel mine clearing 
and against the small arms trade13. This evolution was part of a worldwide 
phenomenon.  It  was  increasingly  perceived  at  the  end  of  the  1990s  that 
working in war situations or in regions that are affected by conflicts is an 
integral  part  of  the  development  challenge.  Promoted  by  an  emotionally 
highly  committed  State  secretary,  Belgium  went  particularly  far.  Within 
DGIC a special unit responsible for conflict prevention activities was installed 
and in 1997 two new financing instruments were created to react rapidly and 
flexibly in cases of need. Two new basic allocations were specified in the 
budget (together amounting to about 9.02 million US$ in 1997), i.e. conflict 
prevention, restoring peace and human rights through bilateral co-operation 
and through financing international institutions. By 2000 the budget had risen 
to 10.14 million US$.  
Moreels also emphasised the so-called ‘social economy’, comprising 
small-scale informal sector activities and alternative systems of social security 
and credit provision. Probably prompted by a desire to counter the negative 
association  of  development  co-operation  and  unscrupulous  big  business, 
Moreels  promoted  co-operation  between  Belgian  and  partner  countries’ 
small and medium-sized enterprises through a special facility. He thereby 
started from the unproven premise that small and medium-sized enterprises 
have a higher degree of development relevance, efficiency and impact. 
Boutmans (since 1999) had no problems endorsing the priority sectors 
and themes of the Law on International Development voted in 1999 under 
his predecessor. As a politician from a ‘Green’ party he put extra emphasis 
on environmental issues, both in rural but also increasingly in urban areas, 
the medical, social and economic problems caused by AIDS, and on culture. 
As a lawyer he was also keen to continue the emphasis put by Derycke and 
Moreels on human rights, conflict prevention and peace building. But he also 
felt that Belgium was not in a moral position to lecture recipient governments 
on how to run their own countries. In November 2001 he created BIO, a public 
company under private law, translating Moreels’ proposal about aid to small 
and medium-sized enterprises into reality [Moniteur belge, Brussels, 17/11/
2001]. His decision to create a separate entity, rather than to entrust this task 
to BTC, was not a very inspired one, and led to a further dispersion of the 
management of development co-operation. Through early consultations with 
DGIC and BTC, BIO has shown its willingness to co-ordinate with the other 
actors of Belgian development co-operation. BIO has been well endowed 
with financial resources14 but by mid-2002 no project has effectively been 
financed, so it is too early to judge its functioning. 
13  In  1995,  Belgium  was  very 
active at the international Confer-
ence  on  Disarmament.  Belgium 
further  tried  to  play  a  leading 
role  in  international  efforts  to 
limit the production, sale and use 
of  anti-personnel  landmines.  It 
continues to play a leadership role 
in  promoting  universalization 
and  effective  implementation  of 
the Mine Ban Treaty and served 
as co-rapporteur of the Standing 
Committees  of  Experts  on  the 
General  Status  of  the  Conven-
tion. 
14 The public sector pledged a fi-
nancial participation of about
5 million euro to the capital of the 
company.  Aside  from  this  capi-
tal,  the  Belgium  state  provides 
additional  resources  through 
‘development  certificates’  for  a 
maximum  amount  of  about  97 
million euro, spread over a period 
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3.  Volume targets
  The 0.7 per cent of GNP target was treated less reverentially 
during the 1990s than during previous decades. Derycke used the somewhat 
dubious slogan ‘quality before quantity’ as a title for his policy paper, as if 
both could or should not be pursued together. Moreels re-emphasised the 
quantitative target of 0.7 per cent, but only for the longer term. He proposed 
as an intermediate objective 0.5 per cent of GNP by the end of the legislature. 
Belgium did not come nearer to the 0.7 per cent of GNP target during the 
1990s, on the contrary (see Table 4). The downward trend that started in the 
early 1980s continued. In constant prices, ODA declined during the 1990s, 
whereas  during  the  1980s  no  clear  trend  either  upward  or  downward  is 
discernable, as the following graphs testify. The data are from the DAC.
million US$ (1998 prices)
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year
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Table 4: Breakdown of total Belgian ODA and the general expenditures of 
the DGIC/BADC by type of action (in million US$1, current prices)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1. DGIC Administration costs  33.14 22.53 29.53 32.81 33.47 36.44 40.07 34.83 39.68 35.51 27.10
2. Bilateral (total) 383.84 327.99 409.76 322.76 276.10 328.72 309.47 295.27 307.83 313.12 281.35
    • Direct 246.08 213.95 248.85 164.77 157.89 139.64 153.76 119.93 120.70 129.23 120.28
    • Indirect 137.76 114.05 160.90 157.89 118.20 189.07 155.70 175.34 187.12 183.89 161.06
      - NGO co-financed 64.15 62.47 88.26 90.79 66.26 108.08 90.61 100.13 107.63 98.31 88.15
      - University co-operation 31.01 24.52 32.86 28.02 16.12 50.44 32.15 33.92 40.02 42.60 37.24
3. Bi-Multi DGIC (incl. Belgian Survival Fund,
   Emergency aid)
69.65 49.41 41.73 56.27 43.77 73.43 98.58 58.29 65.87 50.35 78.92
4. Multilateral  
    • UN Group
    • EU Group
    • IDA/World Bank Group





























































Office National du Ducroire (OND) 0 0 52.7 21.25 37.98 38.31 69.11 36.10 102.83 19.87 31.49
Foreign Affairs (except for DGIC) 10.36 14.42 18.38 21.01 13.53 33.55 33.02 27.54 27.08 24.60 37.37
Other Federal Ministries 21.09 10.05 6.45 6.22 8.86 5.71 8.54 6.33 6.82 6.98 6.82
Other Regional Ministries, Provinces and Communes   17.22 16.21 18.63 17.97 20.67 26.06 30.99 24.34 25.12 29.98 36.90
TOTAL (ODA) 894.06 834.07 920.68 836.00 747.56 1044.5 941.23 772.04 889.75 766.71 818.28
ODA/GNP 0.46% 0.42% 0.42% 0.40% 0.32% 0.37% 0.35% 0.31% 0.35% 0.30% 0.36%
Sources : Figures 1990-1994: DGIS [2001b], Figures 1995-2000: DGIS [2002d]
Notes:
1 using DAC exchange rates 
2 including among others loans from state-to-state
3 negative figure due to a decline of the amount of loans from state-to-state, in combination with an  
  increased repayment of the latter
4  the exceptional large amount is due to the fact that in 1993 DGIC instead of the Ministry of Finance  
  paid Belgium’s contribution to IDA. From 1997 till 2000 this was again the case. It explains the steep  
  increase in the multilateral contribution from DGIC to the World Bank Group from 1997 onwards. 
This was the period that the European economic and monetary union 
was being prepared and the Maastricht criteria had been set to assess eligibility 
of the EU member countries. Given that Belgium’s public debt ratio was more 
than double the target rate of 60 per cent of GNP, it was felt by the government 
of the time that reaching the 3 per cent fiscal deficit target was imperative, 
as was some progress towards reducing the public debt ratio, and keeping 
inflation under the target rate. Another contributing factor undoubtedly was 
the crises in the three traditional aid recipient countries in Central Africa. 
A third element explaining the downward trend in the percentage of ODA 
as a share of GNP was the modification of the Development Co-operation 
Fund in 1993. This budget facility made it possible to carry over unspent 
budget appropriations to the following year. As the budget of development 
co-operation has traditionally been characterised by a relatively low spending 
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that the disappearance of this facility would lead to a decline in ODA spending. 
The decline has been lower than expected due to a considerable rise of the 
spending ratio of DGIC, in particular at the end of the 1990s (from about 75 
per cent and 76 per cent in 1994 and 1995 to about 93 per cent in 1999 and to 
more than 99 per cent in 2000) facilitated by an increase of multilateral and 
indirect bilateral aid, categories for which the administrative work burden is 
considerably lower.
4.  Structure and main components of the aid programme
  The aid under the responsibility of DGIC can be decomposed 
in four categories: direct bilateral aid, negotiated by DGIC on behalf of the 
Belgian government, and whose execution is since 1999 entrusted to BTC, 
indirect bilateral aid, i.e. funds entrusted to NGOs and other Belgian non-
public actors who have the right of initiative in allocating these funds, multi-
bi, and finally multilateral aid. The aid administered by other ministries and 
official bodies is discussed below. Table 4 provides a breakdown for the period 
under review. One of the remarkable features of the decade of the 1990s is the 
considerable fall in the importance of direct bilateral aid. From around 40 per 
cent of all DGIC aid at the beginning of the decade it fell to around 20 per 
cent in the closing years of the same decade. This not only represents a fall 
in relative terms, but also in current prices. The slack has been taken up by 
indirect bilateral aid, especially through the NGOs and the universities, and 
by multilateral aid, as shown in the following figure.
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The reduction in the direct bilateral aid, for which DGIC has effective 
responsibility, was not explicitly planned by any of the three secretaries of 
state. It can probably be best explained as a consequence of the continued 
failure  of  DGIC  (and  its  predecessor  BADC)  to  deliver  aid  timely  and 
effectively,  together  with  the  dynamism  of  the  indirect  actors  and  the 
introduction  of  programme  financing  for  the  same  actors,  which  greatly 
reduced transaction costs for the public sector and allowed vastly increased 
spending. To the extent that this shift was the result of a natural competition 
between  direct  and  indirect  actors,  this  was  not  by  itself  an  undesirable 
outcome. What is regrettable, however, is the absence of a serious effort to 
develop a consistent global policy in which the different instruments are 
weighted against each other and complementarities between them exploited. 
The programme funding provisions for NGOs, universities, and some other 
minor indirect actors, all of them developed during the decade of the 1990s, 
were  a  considerable  improvement  upon  the  previous  project-by-project 
approval, but DGIC did not take advantage of the possibilities offered by 
the institutionalised dialogue with NGOs and universities to cement fruitful 
collaborations. We will return to this issue below when we discuss indirect 
bilateral aid.
Technical  assistance  no  longer  commands  the  important  place  in 
direct bilateral aid it held during previous decades. The number of long-term 
expatriate (Belgian) experts declined from several thousands in the 1970s to 
some 1200 at the end of the 1980s. By the mid-1990s the number had fallen 
below 500, and at the end of the decade to less than 300. The breakdown or 
at least interruption of aid relations with the three main recipients of Belgian 
technical assistance during the 1990s, DR Congo, Burundi and Rwanda, is a 
major cause of this striking trend. Belgian aid officials were probably also not 
insensitive to the many criticisms voiced against long-term expatriate experts 
[DAC, 1995, 1997]. A similar re-orientation also took place for scholarships 
and training courses. More emphasis was put on local or mixed scholarships 
and study grants in Belgium were restricted to post-graduate studies and to 
short-term specialised training courses. This evolution also matched changes 
in the indirect bilateral co-operation with Belgian universities that put more 
emphasis on long-term institutional North-South co-operation. 
Project aid remained the key instrument of Belgian direct bilateral 
aid, but its importance in total aid declined. The 1990s were characterised 
by sturdy growth in the share of indirect bilateral aid, as indicated above. 
This has been made possible by the introduction of programme funding, 
which  shifted  autonomy  and  responsibility  to  the  indirect  partners.  The 
Belgian  administration  distinguishes  between  three  partners  of  indirect 
co-operation: recognised non-governmental organisations (NGOs), Belgian 
universities and specialised privately incorporated organisations such as the 
Association for the Promotion of Education and Training Abroad (APEFE), 
and its Flemish counterpart, the Association for Development Co-operation 
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Tropical Medicine in Antwerp. We will focus on the first two, which are the 
most important ones in budgetary terms. 
In  volume  terms,  NGO  co-financing  remained  the  major  item  of 
indirect  bilateral  aid.  At  the  beginning  of  the  1990s,  subsidies  to  NGOs 
amounted to 7 per cent of Belgian ODA. This share increased to 10 per cent 
in 2000. NGOs spent most co-financing funds on projects (65 per cent in 
2000). Long-term expatriate NGO experts (previously called ‘volunteers’) 
are second in importance (20 per cent), followed by development education in 
Belgium (12 per cent) and training and scholarships (3 per cent). 
During  the  1990s,  the  relationship  between  the  government  and 
NGOs was characterised by a gradual move from project-by-project funding 
to  programme  funding.  In  1991  programme  funding  was  introduced  for 
the larger and more experienced NGOs, while the traditional project co-
financing scheme was kept in place for the bulk of NGOs. The modality of 
programme aid was extended to all NGOs from 1997 onwards. Since these 
reforms,  NGOs  submit  five-yearly  programmes  and  annual  action  plans.   
The main objective of these reforms was to reduce transaction costs for both 
NGOs  and  the  administration  through  a  simplification  of  administrative 
procedures.  Incentives  were  created  to  increase  professionalism  and  far-
reaching clustering among NGOs. The work of the aid administration shifted 
from laborious bureaucratic ex-ante control of individual projects submitted 
to monitoring and ex-post evaluation. Whereas DGIC officials had difficulty 
adjusting to the new type of aid management and while they still tended 
to assess the yearly action plans as packages of projects, they nevertheless 
increasingly switched to the new programme logic, as seen by the increase in 
field inspections. In addition, external experts have been appointed to assist 
the administration in its policy dialogue with the NGOs and the evaluation of 
programmes. Co-ordination among NGOs was favoured through the formal 
recognition and financing of two federations, one for the Flemish NGOs and 
one for the francophone (and German- speaking) NGOs who represented 
NGOs in their relations with the government. Consultation between the NGOs 
and the government was institutionalised through three committees, each one 
in charge of a particular field of activity. Consultation among the NGOs and 
the  administration  was  further  strengthened  from  1998  onwards  through 
the institutionalisation of policy dialogues between the administration and 
individual NGOs on the occasion of the submission of the programme and the 
yearly action plans. An NGO consultative committee was installed to provide 
advice at the request of the state secretary, the federations, an individual NGO 
or on its own initiative. It met approximately about ten times a year.  
Although  generally  recognised  as  a  major  breakthrough,  NGO 
programme  funding  suffers  from  some  weaknesses.  First  and  foremost, 
the government failed to weed out the large number of small NGOs who 
previously had access to project financing. Many such NGOs are run by a 
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and are hardly equipped to perform their assigned tasks adequately. As a 
consequence programme funding is now extended to up to 100 NGOs, many 
of them too small and institutionally too unstable to warrant the considerable 
trust imparted to them under programme funding. A much smaller number of, 
say, ten to 15, would have been preferable from a public sector management 
perspective, with the rest either receiving project funding directly or through 
consortia of larger NGOs. A financial incentive for NGOs to merge or form 
alliances did not give the expected results, as subsequent secretaries of state 
estimated  that  small  emerging  NGOs  ought  to  be  given  a  chance  to  get 
direct access to government co-financing, and in this way contributed to the 
dispersion rather than the concentration of funding. Second, the opportunity 
offered by the new consultation mechanisms to enter into a policy dialogue 
with the NGO community in view of a co-ordination of activities among 
themselves and with the public sector was not taken up, due in part to the 
resistance of the NGOs, but also because the DGIC did not bring a  coherent 
policy strategy to the negotiating table. Third, evaluation of the functioning 
of the NGOs and their field achievements, crucial for a system of programme 
funding to work fairly and efficiently, was not undertaken systematically. The 
administration thus lacked the authority to credibly assess individual NGOs 
and reward good performance.
Table 5: 10 major recipients of Belgian NGO support and Belgian direct 




DR Congo 6.1 Rwanda 9.3
India 3.2 Bolivia 7.3
Brazil 3.1 Ivory Coast 5.6
Philippines 2.3 Morocco 5.6
Peru 2.2 Niger 5.4
Bolivia 2.0 DR Congo 5.2
Ecuador 2.0 Tunisia 5.1
Nicaragua 1.5 Tanzania 4.3
Rwanda 1.4 Algeria 3.6
Guatemala 1.3 Burkina Faso 3.5
Source: calculated on the basis of Annual DGIC Reports (period 1990-2000) 
A  glance  at  the  geographical  distribution  of  NGO  spending  and 
of direct bilateral spending in Table 5 reveals that there is not much co-
ordination or spontaneous overlap. Countries such as Brazil, India, Nicaragua 
or Guatemala are important destinations of NGO funding, but do not receive 
any direct bilateral aid. Of the countries in Table 5 only three are common to 
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The reform of the indirect university co-operation was governed by 
agreements between the Belgian state and the Inter-university Councils of 
the two major Belgian communities, i.e. the Flemish Inter-university Council 
(VLIR,  representing  the  Flemish  universities)  and  the  Inter-university 
Council of the French Community (CIUF, representing the French-language 
universities).  The  main  focus  of  the  reform  was  to  give  the  universities 
greater responsibility while allowing the administration to concentrate on 
the important functions of policy dialogue, monitoring, and evaluation. The 
agreements  set  the  framework  regarding  different  tools  of  university  co-
operation, i.e. training in Belgian universities of students from developing 
countries, so-called North actions (involving all development co-operation 
activities carried out by Belgian universities in the North), own initiatives of 
Belgian universities to reinforce the teaching and research capacities in the 
South and institutional university co-operation. The latter form of university 
co-operation, which has risen sharply over the years aims at strengthening 
the teaching, research and administrative capacities of a limited number of 
partner institutions. Although the programme framework has undoubtedly 
allowed the Belgian universities to gain experience as development actors 
and to exert considerable peer control, the DGIC has failed to exploit the 
advantages  offered  by  the  policy  dialogue  to  co-ordinate  university  co-
operation with its own bilateral programme. On the positive side, evaluations 
are being performed on a regular basis.
Multilateral aid constitutes a considerable part of Belgian aid (see Table 
4). There is an almost complete separation in the management of multilateral 
and bilateral aid. Complementarities and synergies are not pursued. The major 
item is the contribution to the European Development Fund (EDF) of the EU, 
which rose to 41 per cent of the multilateral budget in 2000. Subsequent Belgian 
governments were enthusiastic supporters of the EU, and contributions to 
the EDF, negotiated at the EU, were consequently hardly being questioned, 
although  the  quality  of  EU  development  aid  was  not  in  general  highly 
regarded within DGIC. Another part of the multilateral budget was taken up 
by compulsory contributions or internationally negotiated contributions, such 
as the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank, and 
the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). What remained is a large number of 
highly dispersed and often relatively small voluntary contributions to dozens 
of organisations, often earmarked for particular interventions. The law on 
International Co-operation of 25 May 1999 envisaged the concentration of 
multilateral aid to about 20 multilateral organisations. Another, subsequent 
reform  in  2002  foresaw  pluri-annual  commitments  within  a  programme 
framework to some of those organisations, an innovative feature not only 
for Belgium. As a consequence Belgian non-EU multilateral co-operation 
contributes financially to 27 international organisations, five of which receive 
an internationally set contribution15 while the 22 remaining were singled out 
for voluntary contributions. Criteria used by DGIC include the consistency 
between the mandate and the activities of the organisations on the one hand 
and the priorities of Belgian development co-operation, consistency between 
15 These  include  IDA,  GEF,  MP 
(Montreal Protocol), CCD (Unit-
ed Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification) and IFAD (Inter-
national  Fund  for  Agricultural 
Development).26 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 • 27
the Belgian contribution to the organisation and the contribution of other 
actors to the same organisation, and a management approach on behalf of 
the organisation which permits an ex ante appraisal and evaluation of its 
functioning. In order to work out a detailed assessment sheet per organisation 
that could also be used to follow-up the performance over time, the criteria 
have  been  fine-tuned  and  made  operational  through  the  definition  of  36 
indicators [DGIC, 2002b]. The assessment sheets were used for the first time 
in 2000 to select 14 multilateral organisations16 that would henceforth benefit 
from either core-funding or programme funding and eight organisations17 that 
would receive funding of earmarked components of their activities.  
The Belgian Survival Fund (BSF) is an important vehicle for multi-bi 
co-operation. It was set up in 1983 as a result of a Parliamentary initiative, 
with the aim to provide additional aid funds, collected from the state-run 
lottery, to improve the food security of households in 18 selected countries 
of SSA (not necessarily concentration countries of Belgium development co-
operation), affected by chronic food shortages, poor access to basic services 
and a high infant mortality rate. An innovating feature of the programme 
was the adoption of an integrated approach towards food security and the co-
operation among a number of international development organisations (IFAD, 
FAO, UNCDF, UNICEF). Some 15 larger Belgian NGOs also received funds 
from BSF. In a later phase some of the BSF funds were also used for direct 
bilateral projects. The major criticism against the BSF has been its slow pace 
of implementation. During the first phase of the BSF, covering a period of 
ten years, there was an authorisation from Parliament to commit about US$ 
300 million, but by the beginning of the 1990s only half had effectively been 
spent. This is maybe not so unusual, given that projects take a long time to 
formulate and are implemented over a number of years. Nevertheless this was 
a source of consistent criticism. After an evaluation in 1993, the second phase 
of the BSF started in 1994. Since then the rate of disbursements has increased, 
partly due to the system of annual programming. More emphasis has also 
been put on the projects’ degree of innovation, sustainability and multiplier 
effects on poverty reduction and food security [DAC, 1997]. After a series of 
further evaluations carried out in collaboration with the operating partners at 
the end of the 1990s, the modalities of the use of BSF funds were fine-tuned 
[DGIC, 2002c]. 
16  See  Moniteur  Belge  [14  June 
2000].  These  14  organisations 
include  two  intergovernmental 
agencies which do not belong to 
the UN system, i.e. ICRC (Inter-
national  Committee  of  the  Red 
Cross)  and  IDEA  (International 
Institute  for  Democracy  and 
Electoral Assistance) and 12 UN 
agencies:  UNDP  (United  Na-
tions  Development  Programme), 
UNCTAD  (United  Nations 
Conference  on  Trade  and  De-
velopment),  UNEP  (United  Na-
tions  Environment  Programme), 
UNHCR  (United  Nations  High 
Commissioner  for  Refugees), 
OHCR (Office of the High Com-
missioner  for  Human  Rights), 
UNFPA (United Nations Popula-
tion Fund), UNICEF (United Na-
tions Children’s Fund), UNIFEM 
(United  Nations  Development 
Fund for Women), UNCDF (Unit-
ed Nations Capital Development 
Fund),  OCHA  (Office  for  the 
Coordination  of  Humanitarian 
Aid),  UNAIDS  (United  Nations 
Programme  against  aids),  and 
HABITAT (United Nations Cen-
tre for Human Settlements). 
17  See  Moniteur  Belge  [14  June 
2000].  The  eigth  organisations 
include  five  UN  specialised 
agencies: ILO (International La-
bour  Organization),  FAO  (Food 
and  Agricultural  Organization), 
UNESCO  (United  Nations  Edu-
cational  Scientific  and  Cultural 
Organization),  WHO  (World 
Health  Organisation)  and  the 
World  Bank;  the  GCIAR  (Con-
sultative  Group  on  International 
Agricultural Research), an organ-
isation associated with the World 
Bank;  the  IOM  (International 
Organisation  for  Migration),  an 
inter-governmental  agency,  and 
the  West  African  Development 
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5.  Country Programming
  Statistics on geographical allocation indicate that Belgian aid is 
highly dispersed. During the 1990s less than 60 per cent of total bilateral aid 
was received by the ten largest recipients. One reason for this is that several 
Ministries and other public agencies are managing part of the aid programme, 
and that there is very little co-ordination between them. But this is certainly 
not the major cause. The situation is in fact only slightly better if we turn to 
the part of the aid budget managed by DGIC (direct plus indirect). 









Rwanda 36.3 20.9 24.4 9.3
DRC 24.5 22.2 11.4 5.2
Burundi 32.7 6.6 25 1.5
Bolivia 9.3 12.1 5.4 7.3
Tanzania 11.8 9.6 5.9 4.3
Morocco 9.2 7.3 6.5 5.6
Vietnam 5.8 9.5 4.7 3.5
Senegal 6.6 7.5 2.9 3.4
Kenya 7.7 6.6 2.7 2.4
Tunisia 6.7 6.7 5.5 5.1
Ecuador 5.7 7.4 3.1 2.6
Burkina Faso 3.5 7.9 1.4 3.5
Niger 4.2 7.1 3.3 5.4
Ivory Coast 4.1 6.9 2.8 5.6
Algeria 6.4 4.3 1.4 3.6
Philippines 4.2 6 1.6 1.6
Indonesia 8.3 1.9 2.9 1.3
Thailand 6.1 3.7 3.5 2.2
Brazil 4.1 5 0 0
Cameroon 5.2 4.1 2.2 2.5
Average 10.1 8.2 5.8 3.8
Source: calculated on the basis of Annual DGIC Reports (1990-2000)
Table 6 provides data on how much the 20 major recipients of aid 
through DGIC received in the first half and the second half of the 1990s. As 
can be seen the average is around 10 to 8 million US$ per year, with many 
countries receiving less than 8 million US$. The picture is even starker if 
we concentrate on direct bilateral aid managed directly by DGIC. The data 
appear in the second part of Table 6, and as can be seen the average is around 
4 to 6 million US$, depending on the period under consideration. Fixed 
costs are high in terms of geographical desks in Brussels and field offices in 
the recipient country. Even with just a few staff manning the desks, it adds 
up to an important sum compared to the small amount of aid that is being 
allocated.28 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 • 29
One consequence of the geographical dispersion of aid can be seen 
from Table 7.










Ivory Coast >10 na
Burkina Faso >10 na
Tunisia 6 2%
1Rank: Belgium’s rank among multilateral and bilateral donors.
2Importance: Belgium’s contribution as a per centage of those donors preceding it in the ranking list.
3na: not available in DAC tables.
Source: on the basis of DAC [2002a, 2002b], 
These ten countries are ‘major’ recipients from a Belgian perspective 
and, with the exception of Cameroon and Tunisia, had the status of programme 
countries in Brussels, but from a recipient perspective Belgium is hardly an 
important donor, except in the case of the DR Congo. If one considers that 
Belgium only contributes between one and 1.5 per cent of DAC bilateral aid, 
this result is not surprising. But it puts the notion of programme country into 
perspective. Until the 1980s, the geographical distribution of Belgian aid was 
highly skewed towards DR Congo, Rwanda and Burundi. In the five years 
preceding our period of study (1985-1989) the three main recipients obtained 
more than half of bilateral ODA. In these countries Belgium was a major 
donor.  The rest of bilateral aid was widely dispersed over a large number of 
countries, many of them receiving funding for one or two projects.  During 
the 1960s and 1970s the concentration was even more pronounced. 
As a consequence, Belgium is now a small donor with little clout in 
most countries in which it is active.  In the past, the issues brought up by the 
marginal status of Belgian aid compared to dozens of larger multilateral and 
bilateral donors were mainly addressed by putting the emphasis on project 
aid as a major instrument of aid and by shirking away from policy dialogue at 
sector or macro levels. But if it is believed, as is at present fashionable to do, 
that project aid as a form of conditionality is an illusion [World Bank, 1998], 
and if it is further argued that in aid-dependent countries project aid, with all 
its donor-imposed bureaucracy, undermines the institutional capacity of the 
recipient government to plan, budget and implement their own development, 
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reflection of what, if any, the contribution might be of small bilateral donors 
in a post-project area, except as providers of funds, has not been squarely 
faced by Belgian aid officials. For Central Africa, there is the feeling that 
there is some role for an overall foreign policy in which aid has an important 
place, and which involves putting pressure at the highest level. For the other 
countries, it is not clear that the notion of programme country makes much 
sense.
Although  the  above  results  would  suggest  otherwise,  successive 
governments  congratulated  themselves  on  the  efforts  at  concentrating 
bilateral  aid.  Table  8  shows  the  ‘programme  countries’  selected  by  the 
successive governments.30 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 • 31











2 Benin x x x
3 Burkina Faso x x x
4 Burundi x x x x
5 Cameroon x x
6 DR Congo x x x
7 Ethiopia x x
8 Gabon x
9 Ivory Coast x x x
10 Kenya x x x
11 Mali x x x
12 Mozambique x
13 Niger x x x x
14 Rwanda x x x
15 SADC x x x x
16 Senegal x x
17 South Africa x x
18 Tanzania x x x x
19 Uganda x x x
North Africa and Middle-
20 Algeria x x x
21 Morocco x x x x
22 Palestine x x
23 Tunisia x x x
Asia
24 Bangladesh x x x
25 Cambodia x x x
26 Indonesia x
27 Laos x x x
28 Philippines x x
29 Thailand x
30 Vietnam x x x
31 Asean region x
Central and Latin America
32 Bolivia x x x x
33 Ecuador x x x
34 Peru x x x
35 Surinam x
1 As proposed in a mid-1994 paper on the geographical concentration policy.
  This list was not officially endorsed by the government.  30 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 • 31
The lists are far too long to have any effect on the concentration of aid. 
A maximum of ten countries instead of up to 25 would be more reasonable 
from this perspective. Second, the list changes from one government to the 
next. There seemed to have been no agreement across political parties to 
keep the list the same for a period of time bridging several legislations. As 
a consequence 35 countries were at one moment or another a programme 
country  during  the  1990s.  Out  of  those  only  6  were  on  the  list  for  the 
whole decade, as can be seen from Table 8. Furthermore, non-programme 
countries also continued to receive aid, sometimes more than the programme 
countries. 
6.  Institutional Set-up, Changes and Problems
  During the 1980s and early 1990s several attempts were made 
to reform the administration.  Both Minister Geens and secretary of state 
Derycke tried their hand at it. Their reforms had in common that they were 
based on the idea that the same administrative division should be responsible 
for as large a part of a cycle of planning and implementation as possible. 
This came to be called the principle of A to Z responsibility. A corollary 
was that head of departments could also be held accountable for the final 
outcome. During the second half of the decade another, much more drastic, 
overhaul of the administration was prepared under secretary of state Moreels 
and further put in practice by his successor, secretary of state Boutmans.   
That Moreels could go much further in his reform than his predecessors 
was due to a number of factors. There were the scandals that had rocked the 
administration at the beginning of his mandate, and had led to the setting up 
of an ad hoc parliamentary commission that presented its recommendations 
in 1997. Moreels had also the advantage of reporting directly to a forceful 
prime  minister  Dehaene,  who  supported  his  fellow  Flemish  Christian-
democrat. The Moreels reform was enacted  in 1998-2000 and consisted 
of three parts. First, and foremost, a new unit, the Belgian Technical Co-
operation (BTC), was set up as a public company. This had the advantage 
of allowing a flexible personnel policy, and also addressing the problem of 
a cruel shortage of high-level personnel that had plagued the administration 
for a long period of time. BTC was governed by a board made up of experts, 
appointed by the government. Moreels, with his background as president of an 
efficiently run major humanitarion NGO, Médecins Sans Frontières, felt that 
the major weakness was the slowness and ineffectiveness of implementation 
of operations in the field, and BTC was the new tool that would allow this 
constraint to be overcome. The remaining administrative and management 
tasks, mainly strategy and policy preparation, would be left to the BADC. 
BADC was part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but had enjoyed substantial 
autonomy. Moreels integrated this department more fully in Foreign Affairs, 
without however merging it. What this meant was that BADC was renamed 
into the Directorate General of International Co-operation (DGIC), but with 
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a State secretary responsible at the level of the government. A third part of 
the reform was the creation of a separate evaluation unit, with an independent 
head of evaluation, to be recruited from outside the administration. 
The reform was set in motion under Moreels, and further implemented 
under his successor, state secretary Boutmans. Boutmans felt however that 
continuity was of the utmost importance, and that the new government could 
therefore not backtrack on the reforms that had been left unfinished by the 
previous government. Boutmans faithfully implemented what was handed 
down to him, notwithstanding his personal misgivings. The creation of BIO 
was his own device. The idea came again from his predecessor, but Boutmans 
decided that this task should not be entrusted to BTC. By creating yet another 
independent public company, this time in charge of supporting small and 
medium-sized  enterprises  in  developing  countries,  Boutmans  made  the 
administrative landscape even more complex than it already was.
It may be too early to judge this major reform by its outcome, but 
several critical comments are in order. First, the reform goes against the grain 
of the efforts of the predecessors of Moreels, Geens and Derycke. Instead of 
A to Z responsibility, the functions of policy preparation and implementation 
were  again  radically  split,  with  all  the  risks  of  poor  co-ordination  and 
administrative infighting that had been experienced during the 1980s.  At the 
very least, this testifies to a lack of institutional memory in the modernization 
of the administration. This is linked to the fact that in Belgium such reforms 
are  very  much  imposed  by  the  government  on  the  administration,  with 
minimal participation from the latter. Every new minister or state secretary, 
with his inner circle of handpicked personal ‘cabinet’ advisors, starts the 
process of analyzing the weaknesses of the administration afresh, driven 
by a political will to make a difference, to plant the flag of the new man 
in charge, even if it means swinging back the pendulum of reform in the 
opposite direction from the predecessor. Second, the Moreels reform was not 
in line with the new thinking that was emerging at the time in international 
circles. BTC, like the German GTZ on which it was loosely inspired, was set 
up to leave the donor in charge of implementation, and seems to have been 
conceived with old style donor-driven projects and technical assistance in 
mind. Moreels, with his background in humanitarian aid, was either unaware 
of or oblivious to the increasing calls for more recipient country ownership 
during  implementation.  To  put  it  sharply,  if  the  move  is  towards  budget 
support under recipient-formulated and owned strategies for development 
and attacking poverty, as is now tempted with the PRSP approach, then BTC 
seemed an odd choice for preparing the administration for these new tasks. 
Third, Moreels did not acknowledge the important weaknesses in terms of 
strategy preparation and policy analysis. The part of BADC that was left over 
after the implementation tasks were taken away, was structurally weak and 
unprepared for its important residual tasks. The name change into DGIC and 
the partial integration into Foreign Affairs did not solve any of this. In one 
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of human resources with foreign affairs. But it could not go much further than 
it actually did without risking the wholesale taking over of the administration 
by the much larger and conservative foreign affairs ministry, with its limited 
interest in development.  Fourth, the new evaluation structure emphasised 
the accountability dimension of evaluation to the detriment of the learning 
function of evaluation, although this feature was not proposed by Moreels. 
In effect, the removal of the evaluation function from DGIC suppressed the 
critical reflection on current practices as a tool of internal quality control 
within  the  organisation18.  Fifth,  the  new  setup  was  administratively  very 
complex and bound to run into co-ordination problems. For instance both 
BTC and DGIC set up field offices in the 25 or so programme countries, 
each  of  which  has  to  relay  with  the  geographical  desk  in  the  respective 
headquarters in Brussels.  
Another  institutional  aspect  that  we  wish  to  discuss  here  is  the 
relationship  between  the  aid  administration  and  other  ministries  that  are 
also involved in aid policies. In the previous paragraph we already discussed 
how DGIC was partially integrated without a full merger into the ministry 
of foreign affairs. Notwithstanding this closer administrative and physical 
proximity, the co-ordination between DGIC and the rest of the ministry of 
foreign affairs did not work very well the first years. This was most striking 
in the field of human rights, humanitarian aid and conflict prevention, all 
of which taken up by development co-operation as new themes during the 
1990s, while at the same time remaining areas of interest at the ministry of 
foreign affairs. There has been surprisingly little exchange and collaboration 
between the departments, leading to a loss of efficiency and effectiveness of 
Belgian actions. It seemed at times that the new relationship between DGIC 
and foreign affairs was too close for comfort, not only for the administration, 
but  also  for  politicians.  There  have  been  frequent  clashes  between  state 
secretary of development co-operation Boutmans and minister of foreign 
affairs  Michel.  Both  politicians  belong  to  different  political  parties  and 
language groups, and have very different styles of operating. 
The relations between development co-operation and the ministry of 
finance are more distant but equally difficult. As already indicated before, the 
civil servants at finance are very jealous of their role of representing Belgium 
at the International Financial Institutions19. Development co-operation has not 
been  allowed  to  post  any  staff  to  the  delegation  to  the  World  Bank  in 
Washington for instance, in contrast with the practice of important bilateral 
donors such as the US, France, Germany, UK, and also the Scandinavian 
donors and the Netherlands. By contrast, the Belgian ministry of finance did 
not relent, even after DGIC suggested that it would bear all the related costs, 
and even after it had started paying the contributions to IDA from its budget. 
This has led to a lack of communication between development co-operation 
and the IFIs. One of the consequences is that the Belgian aid administration 
largely missed out on the lively debate that was going on in Washington on 
such diverse matters as debt relief, the need to integrate poverty reduction in 
19  The  following  incident  is  il-
lustrative.  In  2001  a  Belgian 
Treasury official, stationed at the 
Belgian  delegation  to  the  World 
Bank  Washington,  was  sent 
back  to  Brussels,  apparently  as 
a  sanction  for  having  consulted 
with a colleague from DGIC over 
the preparation of the Monterrey 
Conference on Financing Devel-
opment.
18  This  analysis  is  endorsed  by 
the  2001  DAC  Peer  Review  of 
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macroeconomic strate-gies, or on new aid instruments such as budget support. 
During much of the 1990s the Belgian minister of finance, Philippe Maystadt, 
was chairman of the influential Interim Committee of the Board of Governors 
at the IMF. In this capacity he was involved in some important discussions on 
debt relief. Yet it is remarkable that almost nothing of this was communicated 
internally between the two departments. Aid officials would find out indirectly 
what Maystadt was saying on behalf of the Belgian government, and also 
indirectly on their behalf. There were no important debriefings, and little 
feedback, let alone dialogue.
Another difficult relationship was that between the federal govern-
ment in Brussels and the many complex layers of local authorities that had 
been given more and more responsibility after each round of constitutional 
reform in Belgium. This has some bearing on our topic, as the constitution of 
1993 confers considerable rights to the Regions (Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels) 
and the Communities (French, Flemish and German speaking) in the domain 
of foreign policy. There is probably no other country in the world where 
decentralised political authorities have such far-reaching powers. This has for 
instance led to intense consultation between the federal and decentralised 
governments during the Belgian EU presidency in the second half of 2001, 
including  EU  ministerial  meetings  being  chaired  by  ministers  from 
decentralised government on behalf of the different Belgian governments. 
The same overlap of authority exists in the area of development co-oper-
ation.  The  Flemish  government  for  instance  has  signed  international  co-
operation treaties with South Africa and Chile and extended aid to them. 
The above may help explain why an independent development policy 
at  the  federal  level,  without  any  involvement  of  decentralised  levels  of 
government,  is  politically  becoming  increasingly  difficult.  Not  only  did 
the decentralised governments, using their own resources, start to deploy 
their own development policies, but they became more and more outspoken 
claimants for a bigger part of the federal cake of the aid budget. During the 
decade of the 1990s all the main parties in the Flemish Parliament for instance 
approved a declaration that large parts of development co-operation should be 
handed over to the Flemish government. 
All this came to a head in 2000, during the so-called Lambermont 
negotiations, in preparation of a series of complex reforms that would yet 
again  reshuffle  some  of  the  responsibilities  between  different  layers  of 
government. It was decided that parts of development co-operation would 
be handed over to the decentralised governments. Following the principle ‘in 
foro interno, in for externo’, every layer of government represents Belgium 
outside the country in areas in which it has responsibility within Belgium. 
This is for instance the case with education, agriculture, infrastructure, and 
the environment. On this basis the Flemish and francophone governments 
had requested that development co-operation be split along sector lines, and 
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of this plan, the Flemish and francophone governments would select their 
own partner countries, set up their own aid agencies, fund their own projects 
in areas under their responsibility. The federal government would still be in 
charge of for instance multilateral aid, and the tasks traditionally entrusted 
to the Ministry of Finance. The final Lambermont agreement, accepted by 
the parties of the coalition and some of the opposition, accepted the principle 
that part of development co-operation would be handed over to decentralised 
levels of government by 2004, but did not give any details. 
The agreement was met with dismay by the majority of NGOs and 
development  experts.  State  secretary  Boutmans  publicly  expressed  his 
opposition, but did not resign over it. The DAC was openly critical in its 2001 
peer review of Belgium. A Senate commission studied the issue in 2001 and 
invited experts and representatives of NGOs and the academic world to give 
their views. Significantly, at the end the commission could not find a majority 
in favour of the so-called regionalisation of development co-operation. In the 
meantime the issue has been sent to a technical working group that has to work 
out the details. Staff at DGIC and BTC were shaken. The Moreels reform has 
not been completely worked out in all its details, and already another, even 
more massive reform of development co-operation is hanging in the air.
7.  Main Actors and the Public Support of
  the Aid Programme
  All  major  political  parties  in  Belgium  remained  committed 
to  development  co-operation.  If  anything,  a  stronger  consensus  on  the 
importance of aid prevailed at the end of the decade than at the beginning. 
Excellencies of the liberal, christian-democratic, socialist, and green parties 
pursued  active  policies  in  the  areas  of  aid  and  foreign  policy,  especially 
towards Central Africa. The liberals, traditionally the most skeptical and the 
most likely to emphasise Belgian commercial and economic interests over 
development issues, became major defenders of a foreign policy ‘of the heart’. 
Of the government in office at the end of the decade, both Prime Minister 
Guy Verhofstadt (Flemish liberal) and foreign affairs minister Louis Michel 
(francophone  liberal)  were  very  interested  in  development  policies  and 
active on the diplomatic front. There were no signs of disagreements within 
that coalition between the progressive greens and the conservative liberals. 
When tensions arose, they were more related to conflicts of personalities or 
territorial fights than to ideological differences. The only political party that 
took an outspoken anti-aid stand is the ‘Vlaams Blok’, a right-wing Flemish 
nationalist party that came to the fore during the 1990s but remained excluded 
from power by an agreement between the other parties. 
The  press  has  also  remained  largely  positive  towards  development 
aid. In the 1990s, it provided a more critical analysis than during previous 
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almost vitriolic attacks that appeared over several months in the Flemish daily 
‘De Morgen’ and on which we reported earlier. NGOs continued to be very 
forceful actors, influencing both Parliament and the press. During the mid-
1990s a series of scandals and highly critical press reports led to a worrying 
loss of credibility of official aid policies. Secretary of state Moreels, who was 
highly regarded at the time by public opinion and whose moral integrity was 
not in doubt, started to redress this situation. He also attached extra attention 
to informing and educating the general public on development issues, and he 
increased the budget considerably (see Table 3) [DAC, 1997]. Boutmans has 
continued this policy. 
Opinion polls did not always show a clear picture. A major opinion 
poll in Flanders in 1999 indicated that one of three people felt that poverty 
in the third world was among the three most important societal problems, 
contrasting with some earlier results, and suggesting that there might be 
considerable support for official aid in the country. At the end of the decade 
the government decided to gradually increase aid spending over the coming 
years. This decision has not met with any major criticism in the media.36 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 • 37
Conclusions
Aid policies in the 1990s were being pursued in a climate of major 
upheavals. Some of these were externally caused, such as the dramatic events 
in Central Africa. These events in particular marked the end to the post-
colonial period in which Belgium had been providing the major part of its 
bilateral  aid  to  DR  Congo,  Rwanda  and  Burundi.  In  the  past  Belgium 
emphasised  its  ‘special  ties’  with  Central  Africa,  leading  to  fuzzy  and 
unarticulated aid policies. All that has changed. The three countries went 
through  dramatic  crises,  and  the  whole  region  remained  highly  unstable 
during most of the period. Belgian aid dwindled, and diplomacy became as 
important, if not more important, than aid. The aid that no longer went to the 
three traditional beneficiaries was spread out very widely, without any clear 
sense  of  direction  or  a  convincing  effort  at  imposing  some  geographical 
concentration. At the level of motives and overall objectives, aid became more 
complex, with all the major political parties involved in government putting 
emphasis on human rights and governance issues. In another break with the 
past, aid tying was if not abandoned, then at least greatly attenu-ated, except 
for the bilateral aid administered by the ministry of finance. Indirect actors, 
especially NGOs and the universities, became major channels for official aid, 
to the detriment of direct bilateral aid. 
The Achilles heel of aid policies remained administrative manage-
ment despite, or maybe because, several efforts at restructuring. A major 
reform at the end of the decade, splitting the administration in two entities, 
DGIC for planning and BTC for implementation, has not been in operation 
long enough for us to make a balanced judgment, but there are some reasons 
to be skeptical about the good it may bring. The major cloud hanging over 
development policies is however the proposal to hand over important parts to 
the regional governments. This would in practice result in three govern-ments 
in Belgium being in charge of development co-operation, one federal and two 
regional, and would call for yet another major rethinking of mana-gement 
structures.  Notwithstanding  the  overwhelming  negative  comments  from 
national  and  international  experts,  and  appeals  from  major  NGOs  and 
concerned academics not to go ahead with this reform, by mid-2002 there 
were no signs that the government was willing to recant this decision. 38 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-08 • 39
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